2)
But there’s no denying that in recent months, Moscow has gone to great lengths to secure additional ammunition from abroad. In addition to seeking shells from Iran, Russia has tapped Belarusian stockpiles and, according to U.S. intelligence, received some munitions from North Korea. Moscow is now reportedly asking China for artillery ammunition as well as one-way attack drones similar to the Shahed-136 drones already provided by Iran.
To achieve a significant impact on the battlefield, the Islamic Republic would need to provide sustained, large-scale ammunition deliveries to Russia, currently believed to be firing around 10,000 artillery shells per day.
Iran does produce at least some artillery ammunition. Among other things, it makes 122mm and 152mm shells, the calibers used by Russia’s (and many of Ukraine’s) tube artillery pieces, as well as 122mm rockets fired by the Soviet-made BM-21 Grad multiple-launch rocket system. Incidentally, Ukrainian forces have received an unknown number of Iranian-made 152mm and 122mm shells and 122mm Grad rockets, perhaps provided by Washington or an American ally following seizures of Iranian weapon shipments.
But it seems unlikely that Tehran has millions of artillery rounds to spare. Iran’s defense-industrial base has invested primarily in developing its missile and drone programs, devoting less attention to artillery and other ground capabilities.
Just how many rounds Tehran currently has or can produce is hard to say. At least some of the Iranian-made shells and rockets used by Ukraine appear to have been made in 2022. That indicates Iran has hot production lines, although it could also mean Tehran doesn’t have significant stockpiles of older munitions.
In mid-February, Rybar, a popular Russian Telegram channel focused on military affairs, claimed Moscow and Tehran had struck a deal for 100,000 Iranian artillery and mortar rounds and were negotiating the supply of 152mm artillery shells. Rybar further claimed that Iran has “large stocks” of 122mm shells for Soviet-made D-30 howitzers and 122mm rockets for BM-21s.
Whether that’s true is unclear. But based on the composition of Iran’s own artillery arsenal, one can assume Tehran likely couldn’t supply many 152mm shells, the caliber most commonly used by Russia.
According to The Military Balance 2023, Iran’s artillery arsenal includes roughly 700 D-30s and other artillery pieces that fire 122mm shells, plus almost 160 BM-21s and derivative systems that fire 122mm rockets. By contrast, the Islamic Republic has just 30 systems that fire 152mm shells. It therefore stands to reason that Iran has likely invested comparatively little in accumulating 152mm shells than 122mm shells and rockets.
122mm rockets may be the most plentiful munition available for transfer, given that Tehran has supplied numerous Grad rockets (and the know-how to make them) to militias across the Middle East. Most notably, Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese proxy, possessed an estimated 60,000 Grad rockets as of 2014, up from around 10,000-16,000 in 2006, when the terror group fired thousands of rockets at Israel. Hezbollah’s Grad arsenal has likely grown since. But Tehran may be reluctant to deplete that arsenal significantly, lest it reduce Hezbollah’s capacity to threaten Israel.
Thus, while Iranian supplies can certainly help Moscow at the margins, they are unlikely to sustain a Russian military firing many thousands of shells per day. If it’s to receive massive deliveries from abroad, Moscow will likely have to rely on Chinese and North Korean largesse.
Are you a dedicated reader of FDD's Long War Journal? Has our research benefitted you or your team over the years? Support our independent reporting and analysis today by considering a one-time or monthly donation. Thanks for reading! You can make a tax-deductible donation here.
Tags: Iran, russia, ukraine